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WASHINGTON'S JUDICIAL INVALIDATION OF
UNAMBIGUOUS EXCLUSION CLAUSES IN
MULTIPLE CAUSATION INSURANCE CASES
Abstract" The Washington Supreme Court has restricted the use of unambiguous exclu-
sion clauses that limit homeowners' insurance coverage in multiple causation cases. This
Comment discusses the court's "proximate cause" analysis, judicial treatment of policy
exclusions, and the insured's expectations of coverage. The Comment argues that the
Washington approach to multiple causation cases should be narrowly construed in Wash-
ington and rejected in other jurisdictions, because its consequences may harm insurers and
insureds alike.
In recent years, the Washington Supreme Court has placed impor-
tant limits on an insurer's ability to draft policy exclusions that deny
coverage in multiple causation cases.' Multiple causation insurance
cases present a legal issue that has troubled courts in virtually every
jurisdiction: Does an all-risk property insurance policy2 cover a loss
caused by two or more perils when one of the perils is excluded and
the other peril is not excluded? The Washington Supreme Court has
ruled that the policy covers a loss if the non-excluded peril is the effi-
cient proximate cause3 of the damage, even though an excluded peril
contributed to the loss.4 The court has also ruled that an insurer may
1. Multiple causation cases arise under two conceptually different, yet overlapping, types of
circumstances. In some cases, two perils act sequentially to cause the damage through a
causation "chain." For example, torrential rain may cause mudflow that damages a house. In
concurrent causation cases, two perils act independently to cause the damage, with the existence
of neither peril depending on the existence of the other. For example, an earthquake and
negligent construction may act independently and simultaneously to cause damage to the
foundation of a house. See Brewer, Concurrent Causation in Insurance Contracts, 59 MicH. L.
REv. 1141, 1145 (1961). Courts frequently perceive no practical distinction between sequential
and concurrent causation. See, e.g., Frontier Lanes v. Canadian Indem. Co., 26 Wash. App. 342,
613 P.2d 166 (1980). This Comment subsumes both types of causation under the term multiple
causation.
2. An all-risk insurance policy extends coverage for all losses to the subject matter unless the
loss or its cause is specifically excluded. The specified risk or named peril policy extends
coverage only if a peril enumerated in the policy causes the loss. In theory, the all-risk policy
provides broader coverage than the specified risk policy. See Litsey, Property Insurance Coverage
and Policy Exclusions: Problems of Multiple Causation, 35 FIC Q. 415 (1985).
3. Courts and commentators have defined "efficient cause" and "proximate cause" in many
ways. One law dictionary defines efficient cause as "[tihe working cause; that cause which
produces effects or results." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 515 (6th ed. 1990). In Washington tort
law, there may be more than one proximate cause of the damage. See, eg., Pratt v. Thomas, 80
Wash. 2d 117, 119, 491 P.2d 1285, 1286 (1971); Smith v. Acme Paving Co., 16 Wash. App. 389,
396, 558 P.2d 811, 816 (1976). In multiple causation insurance cases, however, Washington
requires the finder of fact to identify only one peril that predominantly caused the loss. See, e.g.,
Graham v. Public Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 98 Wash. 2d 533, 656 P.2d 1077 (1983).




not enforce clauses that unambiguously exclude certain perils
"whether occurring alone or in any sequence with a covered peril."5
Only Washington and California have expressly stated that insurers
may not enforce unambiguous exclusions that deny coverage where
the excluded peril plays any role in the loss. 6
The Washington and California cases present difficult questions
regarding the insurer's need to limit coverage through policy language
and the insured's expectation of coverage for losses that are predomi-
nantly caused by a covered peril. The cases also raise unanswered
questions about the extent of insurers' liability for damage that
appears to be outside the scope of a property insurance policy. This
Comment addresses some of those questions, tracing the development
of judicial limitations on policy exclusions and the application of prox-
imate cause analysis in Washington and other jurisdictions, most nota-
bly California. The Comment argues that the Washington decisions
should be narrowly construed, and that other jurisdictions should
observe unambiguous policy language that excludes a specific peril
regardless of its position in the chain of causation.
I. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF MULTIPLE CAUSATION
INSURANCE CASES
Courts may choose between two established but conflicting doc-
trines when deciding whether to honor clauses that exclude perils that
merely contribute to a loss. First, a court may apply the proximate
cause doctrine. The proximate cause doctrine has existed for hun-
dreds of years in the common law of torts.7 American courts have
borrowed that doctrine to resolve insurance disputes for over a cen-
tury.8 Alternatively, a court may apply principles of contract law.
Courts have traditionally viewed insurance policies as contracts and
5. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Hirschmann, 112 Wash. 2d 621, 624, 773 P.2d 413, 414 (1989).
6. See id. at 627, 773 P.2d at 415-16; Howell v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 218 Cal.
App. 3d 1446, 267 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1990), review denied, No. S015345 (Cal., June 21, 1990)
(LEXIS, Lexsee Service).
7. The original definition of proximate cause came from Francis Bacon, Lord Chancellor, in
1630. Bacon focused on the proximity in time and space of the cause to the damage. S. SPEISER,
C. KRAUSE & A. GANs, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 11:1 (1986). The term now refers
only to whether the cause is legally sufficient to establish liability. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF
ToRTS 236-90 (4th ed. 1971).
8. The proximate cause rule in insurance cases originated, in Louisiana Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Tweed, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 44 (1869). The most famous early case applying the proximate cause
doctrine to an insurance dispute was Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 120
N.E. 86 (1918). In Bird, Justice Cardozo treated the notion of proximate cause in terms of
proximity in time and space. 120 N.E. at 87-89.
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have resolved disputes in accordance with policy language.' If a court
applies principles of contract law, the threshold issue is whether the
policy unambiguously denies coverage in the case at hand. 0 If the
policy unambiguously denies coverage, it is not necessary to consider
the relative importance of different perils that contributed to a loss.
A. Judicial Limitations on Insurance Policy Exclusions
For many years, courts have placed limits on insurance policy
exclusions. 1 From the time of the earliest marine policies drafted at
Lloyd's Coffee House in England, some insurers have been tempted to
place overly restrictive limitations on coverage.1 2  Some insurers
drafted limitations that were unconscionable on their face or were con-
cealed in a maze of fine print.13 Although early policies were fre-
quently negotiated between business people of equal sophistication,
insurers developed standard policies as they marketed their products
to a wider range of consumers. 4 Many policies became adhesion con-
tracts that left little bargaining power to consumers. 15  Courts
responded by limiting the insurer's right to place exclusions in all-risk
policies. 16
Courts have limited policy exclusions through various judicial doc-
trines. For example, all courts construe ambiguous policy language
against insurers.17 Many courts also honor the objectively reasonable
expectations of insureds."8 Courts honor an insured's expectations
because insurance policies are complicated and few policyholders read
them. Insureds often do not receive the policy until the contract has
already been made.19 Some courts will therefore honor reasonable
9. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.






16. Id. In addition to common law doctrines, statutes and administrative regulations have
also placed some restrictions on the insurer's discretion in drafting policies. Id at 964.
17. See, e.g., R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 628-30 (1988). One authority
states that when an exclusion seems unfair or socially undesirable, courts strive to find
ambiguities, even where no ambiguity is apparent. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made
Insurance" Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REv. 1151, 1154
(1981).
18. Abraham, supra note 17, at 1153. However, courts usually do not explicitly recognize the
principle of honoring reasonable expectations. See eg., Keeton, supra note 11, at 973.
19. Keeton, supra note 11, at 968.
217
Washington Law Review Vol. 67:215, 1992
expectations of coverage even when the policy is unambiguous. 20
Courts are most likely to apply the expectations principle where the
insurer fails to call the exclusion to the attention of the insured, where
the exclusion is inconsistent with the type of policy at issue, where the
exclusion is substantively unfair, or where no other coverage for the
loss is available.21
Although courts place some limits on the insurer's discretion to
exclude perils from all-risk policies, insurers rely on exclusions when
determining the pricing and availability of these policies.22 Exclusions
permit insurers to offer the advantages of all-risk policies while keep-
ing premiums as low as possible.2 Because all-risk policies offer
advantages to insureds, market forces generally prevent insurers from
drafting so many exclusions that the policies beo:me specified peril
policies in disguise.24 Exclusions also help insurers avoid adverse
selection of policyholders.2" Some perils are unusually severe or are
highly concentrated among a particular group of insureds. If those
perils are not identified and excluded, the inclusion of those perils may
result in higher premiums and lower sales.26 People not confronted
with the included perils will be less likely to buy the insurance. This
may cause the "risk pool"'27 to diminish, and the insurer's ability to
spread the risk will therefore diminish.
20. Abraham, supra note 17, at 1153.
21. Id at 1154.
22. See, eg., J. LAUNIE, J. LEE & N. BAGLINI, PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY AND LIABITrY
UNDERWRITING 92 (2d ed. 1977).
23. All-risk policies provide protection against perils that are unforeseen by the insurer and
the insured. R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 17, at 463. All-risk policies also increase the
likelihood that insureds will prevail in lawsuits. Courts are most likely to interpret all-risk policy
language in a manner that avoids coverage gaps, and insurers assume the burden of proving
exceptions to coverage. Id
24. In all-risk policies "there are [typically] very few provisions which limit the risks that are
to be transferred." Id at 462.
25. "Adverse selection [of insureds] occurs whenever potential insureds are treated alike
irrespective of some factor that differentiates them as insurance risks." Id at 14. When an
insurer does not distinguish between potential insureds who pose sigificantly different risks, a
disproportionately high percentage of applications will come from high-risk applicants because
they will receive a better bargain. Id. If a policy cannot include adequate protections against
adverse selection, insurers must increase premiums to offset potentially higher costs. Id. at 15.
When developing a "risk pool" of policyholders, insurers must therefore ensure that the
policyholders face a roughly equivalent risk of loss.
26. Id. at 14-15.
27. Insurers base premiums upon the predicted cost of meeting losses in the ventures which
the insurer has grouped into a "pool of risks." Id at 11-12. Insurers rely on a large and
predictable risk pool to properly distribute risks among the policyholders. Id. at 12-13.
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B. The Washington Cases
Washington has traditionally viewed insurance policies as contracts
and has respected the insurer's right to limit its liability where such a
limitation does not violate public policy.2" Because insurers are usu-
ally the drafters of insurance policies, Washington courts generally
construe ambiguities against insurers.29 Principles of contract law
suggest that unambiguous exclusion clauses should be enforceable in
all insurance disputes, including multiple causation cases. Recently,
however, the Washington Supreme Court refused to enforce a clause
that unambiguously excluded a peril regardless of the peril's role in
the chain of causation.3"
1. Initial Application of the Proximate Cause Test in Washington
Washington first applied the proximate cause test in Graham v. Pub-
lic Employees Mut. Ins. Co.31 In Graham, mudflow from the eruption
of Mt. St. Helens destroyed the plaintiff's home. The plaintiff's home-
owner's policy did not cover loss "resulting directly or indirectly from
... earth movement." The policy did cover direct loss by "explosion
... resulting from earth movement."32 Leaving to the jury the ques-
tion of whether the eruption was an "explosion resulting from earth
movement," the court considered whether the eruption directly caused
the loss.33 The court determined that "direct loss" referred to the
proximate cause of the loss and that this issue was also a jury
question.34
The importance of Graham concerned the appropriate test of causa-
tion. Graham replaced the "direct, violent, and efficient cause" stan-
28. See, e.g., Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 97 Wash. 2d 203, 643 P.2d 441
(1982); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 50 Wash. 2d 443, 313 P.2d
347 (1957).
29. See, e.g., Morgan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 86 Wash. 2d 432, 545 P.2d 1193 (1976); Hocking
v. British Am. Assurance Co., 62 Wash. 73, 113 P. 259 (1911). In Washington, ambiguous
exclusion clauses are unenforceable as a matter of contract law. See eg., Eurick v. Pemco Ins.
Co., 108 Wash. 2d 338, 738 P.2d 251 (1987).
30. See infra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
31. 98 Wash. 2d 533, 656 P.2d 1077 (1983).
32. Id at 535, 656 P.2d at 1079. The exact policy language stated:
SECTION 1-EXCLUSIONS
We do not cover loss resulting directly or indirectly from:
2. Earth Movement. Direct loss by fire, explosion, theft, or breakage of glass or safety
glazing materials resulting from earth movement is covered.
3. Water damage, meaning:
a. flood...
33. Id at 536-37, 656 P.2d at 1079-80.
34. Id. at 537-39, 656 P.2d at 1080-81.
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dard35 with the "proximate cause" standard.3 6 Insurers are therefore
liable if a covered peril "is the efficient or predominant cause which
sets into motion the chain of events producing the loss," regardless of
whether the peril is "the last act in a chain of events."'3 7 The court did
not directly address whether the earth movement exclusion at issue
was ambiguous.
The dissent in Graham argued that the court failed to apply the
plain language of the policy.38 Chief Justice Brachtenbach stated that
the court must first consider the threshold issue of whether any policy
terms are ambiguous.39 If the terms are unambiguous, the court must
then consider whether the application of those terms would result in
coverage.' The dissent's primary concern was that the court failed to
consider the threshold issue at all.
2. Expansion of the Proximate Cause Test in Washington
Several years after Graham, the court expanded the application of
the proximate cause rule. In Villella v. Public Employees Mut. Ins.
Co.,41 a negligently installed drainage system destabilized the soil
underneath the Villelas' house, and the movement of the soil in turn
damaged the house's foundation.42 The plaintiffs' policy was an all-
risk homeowner's policy, and the damage caused by the contractor's
negligence was not excluded.43 The policy did exclude losses "result-
ing directly or indirectly" from earth movement, which included "any
loss caused by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by" the
shifting of soil.' 4 Although the exclusion applied to earth movement
that merely "contributed" to the loss, the court held that the policy
would cover the loss if the negligence was the efficient proximate
cause.45 The exclusion would not preclude coverage even if the earth
35. Bruener v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 37 Wash. 2d 181, 185, 222 P.2d 833, 835 (1950),
overruled by Graham v. Public Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 98 Wash. 2d 533, 656 P.2d 1077 (1983).
The Bruener view of causation was unusually narrow, however, and the Graham decision
brought Washington in line with the majority ofjurisdictions. Graham, 98 Wash. 2d at 538, 656
P.2d at 1080.
36. Graham, 98 Wash. 2d at 537-38, 656 P.2d at 1080-81.
37. Id at 538, 656 P.2d at 1081.
38. Id. at 540, 656 P.2d at 1082 (Brachtenbach, CJ., dissenting).
39. Id
40. Id
41. 106 Wash. 2d 806, 725 P.2d 957 (1986).
42. Id at 808-09, 725 P.2d at 958.
43. Id at 816, 725 P.2d at 926.
44. Id at 808-09, 725 P.2d at 959.
45. Id at 819, 725 P.2d at 964.
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movement contributed to or aggravated a loss proximately caused by
the contractor's negligence.
The Villella court applied the proximate cause rule even when faced
with a fairly specific exclusion clause. The exclusion denied coverage
for "indirect" losses due to earth movement, including those in which
the earth movement only "contributed to" or "aggravated" the loss.'
Unlike the policy in Graham, the policy in Villela defined "earth
movement." However, Villela also involved ambiguous policy lan-
guage. Although the policy excluded coverage for earth movement, it
did not exclude losses due to both earth movement and a different
covered peril.47 Thus, after Villella, insurers still viewed their primary
task as drafting a sufficiently clear exclusion clause that would circum-
vent the court's proximate cause analysis.48
3. The Hirschmann Decision
In 1989, the Washington Supreme Court took its latest step in
applying the proximate cause rule. In Safeco Ins. Co. v. Hirsch-
mann,49 the court found coverage even though the plaintiffs' home-
owner's policy unambiguously excluded coverage for earth movement
regardless of its importance in the chain of causation. Heavy rains
saturated the soil around the Hirschmanns' house, causing an
embankment to push the house from its foundation. 0 The plaintiffs'
policy excluded damage due to earth movement "whether occurring
alone or in any sequence with a covered peril.""1 Relying on Villella,
the Hirschmann court interpreted the exclusion to apply only where
earth movement was the efficient proximate cause of the damage.5 2
The court warned insurers that future attempts to circumvent the effi-
46. a at 809, 725 P.2d at 959.
47. See Safeco Ins. Co. v. Hirschmann, 112 Wash. 2d 621, 634, 773 P.2d 413, 419 (1989)
(Callow, C.J., dissenting).
48. The Washington Supreme Court later referred to the ongoing attempts of insurers to
circumvent the proximate cause analysis. See id. at 626, 773 P.2d at 415.
49. 112 Wash. 2d 621, 773 P.2d 413 (1989).
50. Ia at 623-24, 773 P.2d at 413-14.
51. Id at 624, 773 P.2d at 414. The exact policy language stated:
We do not cover loss caused by any of the following excluded perils, whether occurring
alone or in any sequence with a covered peril:
2. Earth Movement, meaning:
a. earthquake; landslide; mudflow; earth sinking, rising or shifting; ...
52. The court stated that the term "efficient proximate cause" should appear wherever the
term "cause" appears. Thus, the exclusion clause would read: "We do not cover any loss where
the efficient proximate cause is a landslide, whether occurring alone or in any sequence with a
covered peril." Id. at 629, 773 P.2d at 416-17.
Washington Law Review
cient proximate cause rule through exclusion clauses would not
succeed.53
The Hirschmann dissent focused on the majority's failure to draw
significant distinctions between ambiguous and unambiguous exclu-
sion clauses. 54 Chief Justice Callow emphasized that insurance poli-
cies are contracts and that unambiguous policy language should
therefore determine coverage. 5 In this case, the language was "clear,
explicit, and unambiguous. ' '5 6 The majority's application of the proxi-
mate cause analysis "effectively deprives insurers [and insureds] of the
right to contract for coverage excluding specific risks."'57 Chief Justice
Callow observed that prior case law did not support the invalidation of
an unambiguous exclusion clause.58 Graham and Villella simply indi-
cate "that merely by excluding coverage for loss caused by certain
defined perils, an insurance policy does not plainly negate coverage for
losses caused by both covered and excluded perils." 59 Thus, the Gra-
ham and Villella courts merely "interpreted ambiguous contractual
language to the advantage of the insured."'
C. Cases From Other Jurisdictions
Courts in different jurisdictions have reached various results in mul-
tiple causation cases.61 Because almost all cases prior to Hirsch-
mann I involved ambiguous policy language, it is unclear what result
the various jurisdictions would reach when faced with an unambigu-
ous exclusion clause. That question remains unanswered in almost
every jurisdiction other than Washington and California.63
53. Id. at 627, 773 P.2d at 415-16.
54. Id. at 631-35, 773 P.2d at 418-20 (Callow, CJ., dissenting).
55. Id. at 632, 773 P.2d at 418.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 633, 773 P.2d at 418.
58. Id. at 633-35, 773 P.2d at 418-20. Particularly puzzling was the majority's statement
that "[t]he Villella decision is dispositive of this case." Id. at 626, 773 P.2d at 415. The Villella
decision, unlike Hirschmann. involved an ambiguous exclusion clause.
59. Id. at 634, 773 P.2d at 419 (emphasis in original).
60. Id.
61. See Withers, Proximate Cause and Multiple Causation in First-Party Insurance Cases, 20
FORUM 256 (1985).
62. 112 Wash. 2d 621, 773 P.2d 413 (1989).
63. One recent Arizona case specifically rejected the Washington and California rules in
multiple causation insurance cases. See Millar v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 167 Ariz. 93,
804 P.2d 822 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 168 Ariz. 144, 811 P.2d 1081 (1991).
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L General Treatment By Other Jurisdictions
There is no consensus on the treatment of multiple causation insur-
ance claims. Decisions are often inconsistent within a given jurisdic-
tion."4 Some courts have stated or implied that unambiguous
exclusion clauses eliminate the need for a proximate cause analysis,
even when dealing with all-risk policies.65 Other courts apply a
"direct cause" standard, although it is sometimes unclear how this dif-
fers in application from a proximate cause standard.6 6 Most jurisdic-
tions apply some form of proximate cause analysis.67 Other than
Hirschmann and one California decision, however, no court has
applied this analysis in cases involving unambiguous exclusion
clauses.68
2. The California Cases
California has a highly developed body of case law concerning the
proximate cause test in multiple causation insurance cases.69 Califor-
nia's first modem application of the proximate cause doctrine came in
Sabella v. Wisler.70 In Sabella, a building contractor constructed a
house on uncompacted fill and negligently installed a sewer line.7
The sewer line ruptured, causing water to saturate the ground around
the insureds' house.72 The plaintiffs' all-risk policy did not exclude
negligence, but the policy did exclude damage to the house caused by
earth movement. 7 The court concluded that "'where there is a con-
64. See, eg., Litsey, supra note 2, at 416-17; see also R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 17,
at 547-59; COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D §§ 74:705-721 (rev. ed. 1983).
65. See, eg., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Martin, 872 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1989)
(applying California law); Millar, 804 P.2d at 826; Kane v. Royal Ins. Co., 768 P.2d 678 (Colo.
1989); Underwood v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 118 Ga. App. 847, 165 S.E.2d 874
(1968); Bentley v. National Standard Ins. Co., 507 S.W.2d 652 (rex. Civ. App. 1974).
66. See, eg., Campbell v. Insurance Serv. Agency, 424 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
67. See Goodyear Rubber & Supply, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 545 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1976)
(applying Oregon law); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d
989 (2nd Cir. 1974) (applying New York law).
68. See Millar, 804 P.2d at 826.
69. See. eg., Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 770 P.2d 704, 257
Cal. Rptr. 292 (1989).
70. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963). Although Sabella provides the
current California test in multiple causation cases, California used a proximate cause analysis to
resolve coverage disputes arising from the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. See, eg., Pacific
Union Club v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 12 Cal. App. 503, 107 P. 729 (1910).
71. Sabella, 377 P.2d at 891-92, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 691-92.
72. Id. at 892, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
73. Id. at 894-95, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
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currence of different causes, the efficient cause-the one that sets the
others in motion-is the cause to which the loss is to be attributed.' 4
For ten years following Sabella, California applied the proximate
cause analysis in first-party75 insurance claims involving multiple cau-
sation. 6 In 1973, the California Supreme Court fashioned a standard
for concurrent causation cases that was even more favorable to
insureds, but later ruled that this standard applied only to cases
involving third-party coverage.77 Thus, insurers are not liable in Cali-
fornia if an excluded peril proximately causes the loss. 78
The California Court of Appeals recently held that a property
insurer may not enforce an unambiguous clause that excludes a spe-
cific peril regardless of the peril's importance in the chain of causa-
tion.79 The court explicitly stated that insurers may not draft
exclusions that circumvent the proximate cause analysis.8 0 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court denied review of that case, but that court has
not made such an explicit disavowal of unambiguous exclusion
clauses. Nevertheless, it now appears that California will invalidate
unambiguous clauses that deny coverage when an excluded peril plays
any part in causing the loss.
74. Id. at 895, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 695 (quoting COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1466 (1930)).
75. A first-party claim involves loss or damage sustained by the insured. A third-party claim
involves liability of the insured to another party. Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 48
Cal. 3d 395, 770 P.2d 704, 705 n.2, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292, 293 n.2 (1989).
76. 770 P.2d at 708, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 296; see, eg., Gillis v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 238 Cal.
App. 2d 408, 47 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1965); Sauer v. General Ins. Co., 225 Cal. App. 2d 275, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 303 (1964).
77. In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 811 (1973), the court ruled that a liability policy covers all damage where one of the causes
is a covered peril even if that peril is not the proximate cause of the loss. Partridge involved a
third-party claim. Id. Several California decisions applied that lenient standard to first-party
claims. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Adams, 170 Cal. App. 3d 712, 215 Cal. Rptr. 287, 293-94
(1985); Premier Ins. Co. v. Welch, 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657, 662 (1983); see also
Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551, 554-55 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying California law). The
California Supreme Court later limited the concurrent causation rule to third-party cases,
holding that first-party claims must still satisfy the proximate cause standard. Garvey v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 770 P.2d 704, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1989).
78. Garvey, 770 P.2d at 715, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
79. Howell v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1446, 267 Cal. Rptr. 708
(1990), review denied, No. S015345 (Cal., June 21, 1990) (LEXIS, Le:xsee Service).
80. 267 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
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II. JUSTIFICATIONS AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
REGARDING THE PROXIMATE CAUSE TEST IN
INSURANCE CASES
Washington and California have apparently reached the same con-
clusion about an insurer's ability to deny coverage when a non-
excluded peril predominantly causes a loss. In neither state may an
insurer deny coverage simply because an excluded peril was part of the
causal chain producing the damage, even if the exclusion is unambigu-
ous."1 In both states, the finder of fact must identify one peril which
was the predominant cause of the loss, and the court will find coverage
if the predominant cause was a non-excluded peril. Questions remain,
however, about the extent to which Washington and California have
limited insurers' ability to exclude perils in multiple causation cases.
The Washington and California decisions are subject to two differ-
ent interpretations. On the one hand, the courts may simply be stating
that insurers can exclude a peril only if the exclusions section of the
policy in some way describes the predominant cause of the loss. If so,
insurers may be able to deny coverage by describing every peril that
may act in combination with the peril they wish to exclude.8 2 It is
unclear whether courts will invalidate such combination exclusions as
vague, overly complicated, or inconsistent with the nature of an all-
risk policy.
The second interpretation of the Washington and California cases
suggests that insurers may now be unable to rely on unambiguous
exclusions in multiple causation cases. The courts may be completely
disregarding policy language, choosing instead to mandate coverage
that would otherwise be unavailable. There are, however, serious
problems with such an approach. 3 If courts mandate earth move-
ment coverage, for instance, some people may have difficulty obtaining
affordable homeowner's insurance. Insurers may refuse to underwrite
previously acceptable properties or may eliminate all-risk home-
81. See supra text accompanying notes 53 and 80.
82. Insurers have already drafted policies that enumerate perils that may act in combination
with the peril that is the primary subject of the exclusion. For example, one policy addresses
multiple causation cases by excluding earth movement and "[w]eather [c]onditions that
contribute in any way with a cause or event excluded in this section to produce a loss. However,
any ensuing loss not excluded or excepted in this policy is covered." Safeco Homeowner's Policy
CHO-4203 2/86; see also Unigard Homeowner's Policy HO-3WA ed. 1-89. Thus, if rain was the
proximate cause of a mudslide that damaged a house, the rain would be excluded. If rain
damaged the house without operating in sequence with another excluded peril, the rain would
not be excluded. Insurers hope that the courts will enforce such exclusions even though the peril
that proximately caused the loss is generally not excluded.
83. See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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owner's policies.84 Insurers may also face financial difficulties if they
are held liable for substantial losses for which they have failed to col-
lect premiums. 85
Courts can balance the interests of insurers and insureds by relying
on policy language to determine the scope of coverage, while also
holding insurers to high standards of clarity and notice to the insured.
Washington should permit insurers to deny coverage when the policy
at least conditionally excludes the peril that is the predominant cause
of the loss. Other jurisdictions should continue to consider policy lan-
guage before applying the proximate cause analysis.
A. Justifications for the Washington Decisions
There are two potential justifications for the Washington decisions.
First, exclusions that apply regardless of the substantiality of causa-
tion may be inconsistent with the nature of an all-risk policy. Such
exclusions may apply even where the excluded peril plays only a minor
role in the loss, yielding an unfair result to the insured. Second, such
exclusions may be inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the
insured.
L Exclusions That Apply Regardless of the Substantiality of
Causation May Be Inconsistent With an All-Risk Policy
An all-risk policy that denies coverage through overly restrictive
exclusions may be little more than a failed promise on the part of the
insurer." Insurers impliedly promise that all-risk lolicies cover virtu-
ally every peril that could damage policyholders' homes. Exclusions
are meant to be exceptions to the general rule of coverage. Exclusions
that apply regardless of the substantiality of causation may be too
broad and overreaching to merit judicial enforcement.87 Such exclu-
sions seem to be inconsistent with all-risk policies, because these poli-
cies are intended to cover perils that are difficult to define.88 In
84. See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
86. See e.g., Meehan & Jelks, The Battered Exclusion: Who Pays How Much For Landslides?,
29 FOR THE DEFENSE 19, 26 (1987).
87. The Washington courts may be concerned that insurance poLcies will not cover losses
when the excluded peril plays only a very minor role in the chain of eaisation. Courts should be
able to prevent this result, however, without invalidating exclusions that apply even though the
excluded peril is not the proximate cause of the loss. Courts can rule that a peril which plays an
inconsequential role in a loss is not even a cause within the meaning of the policy. Moreover, in
the Washington cases, the excluded peril played an important role in causing the damage. In all
mudslide losses, the mudflow itself necessarily plays an important rolb in causing the loss.
88. See; e.g., R. KEETON & A. Wims, supra note 17, at 19, 462-63.
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Hirschmann, 89 for example, the insurer presumably intended to cover
torrential rain damage because the policy generally did not exclude
rain.90 By issuing an all-risk policy that covered rain damage but
excluded damage caused by both rain and mud, the insurer seemed to
be promising coverage in one section of the policy while breaking that
promise in another section.
The Washington courts may also be suspicious of insurers' market-
ing methods. Insurers will probably sell more policies by marketing
them as all-risk.91 Policies are not true all-risk policies, however, if
overly broad exclusions restrict coverage. Without judicial con-
straints, insurers may be tempted to encourage consumers to expect
all-risk coverage while providing limited coverage in disguise.92
Courts and consumers have good reason to insist that if insurers
promise an all-risk policy, insurers should deliver an all-risk policy.
2. Exclusions That Fail to Name the Proximate Cause
May Be Inconsistent With the Reasonable Expectations
of the Insured
By invalidating exclusions that apply regardless of the substantiality
of causation, the Washington courts may be attempting to protect the
reasonable expectations of all-risk policyholders.93 Policyholders may
reasonably expect coverage when the proximate cause of the loss is not
specifically excluded. If an exclusion is unambiguous, however, courts
should examine the justifications for the reasonable expectations doc-
trine before applying it in multiple causation cases.
There are three potential reasons for limiting exclusion clauses to
protect an insured's reasonable expectations. 94 First, the expectations
principle may permit insureds to make more informed choices about
insurance coverage because courts will ensure that policies conform to
89. 112 Wash. 2d 621, 773 P.2d 413 (1989).
90. See supra text accompanying note 51.
91. Marketing is a vital consideration in the packaging and underwriting of insurance
policies. See, eg., J. LAUNIF, J. LEE & N. BAGLINI, supra note 22, at 16.
92. Meehan & Jelks, supra note 86, at 20.
93. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. Washington courts have expressly refused
to adopt the reasonable expectations doctrine. See, eg., Keenan v. Industrial Indem. Ins. Co.,
108 Wash. 2d 314, 322, 738 P.2d 270, 275 (1987); State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 102
Wash. 2d 477,485, 687 P.2d 1139, 1144 (1984). The Washington Supreme Court has also stated
that if it did apply the doctrine, the court would do so only when the policy is ambiguous.
Keenan, 108 Wash. 2d at 322, 738 P.2d at 275. However, courts often apply the reasonable
expectations doctrine without clearly identifying the doctrine as the basis for their decisions.
Keeton, supra note 11, at 973.
94. Abraham, supra note 17, at 1169.
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the insureds' understanding.95 Insurers might argue that this justifica-
tion is less compelling in cases where the exclusion is unambiguous,
such as Hirschmann.9 6 If a consumer can understand the policy by
reading it, the consumer can readily determine the scope of coverage
and make an informed decision. In the case of homeowner's insur-
ance, however, the insurance purchaser will probably not receive the
contract until after buying the insurance and perhaps paying the first
premium.97 It is difficult to imagine how any policy language can aid
a consumer's purchasing decision under such circumstances.
Second, the reasonable expectations principle may encourage funda-
mental fairness in the insurance transaction, because courts may
require coverage where the insurer creates the expectation.98 The vol-
canic eruption that caused the mudslide in Graham 9 9 was precisely the
type of unpredictable event that should be covered by an all-risk pol-
icy."°° An insured should expect a mudflow exclusion to apply in a
case like Hirschmann, however, because rain is a predictable cause of
mudslides. Mudslides always operate in combination with another
peril that involves water. Earth movement exclusions will be virtually
worthless unless contributing perils can also be excluded.
Finally, the reasonable expectations principle serves a risk-distribu-
tive function by spreading the cost of otherwise excluded losses among
a large group of insurance consumers, 10' particularly where other
insurance is not available to cover the loss. The Hirschmann, Villella,
and Graham decisions may thus serve a risk-distributive function
because earth movement insurance is not readily available from home-
owner's insurance carriers."0 2 However, the risk-distributive justifica-
tion suggests that courts should mandate coverage that insurers
95. Id.
96. 112 Wash. 2d 621, 773 P.2d 413 (1989).
97. See, eg., Comment, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1461, 1463-64 (1989).
98. Abraham, supra note 17, at 1169.
99. 98 Wash. 2d 533, 656 P.2d 1077 (1983).
100. Assuming, of course, that it is reasonable to consider a volcanic eruption an "explosion"
within the meaning of a homeowner's policy. See supra text accompanying note 33.
101. Abraham, supra note 17, at 1169.
102. Telephone interview with Larry Kees, Executive Vice President, Independent Insurance
Agents of Washington, in Bellevue, Washington (May 16, 1991) (notes on file with the
Washington Law Review). Mudslide insurance is available to property owners in every state
through the National Flood Insurance Program, a federal program offered by the Federal
Insurance Administration and private carriers who choose to participate. Property owners seem
indifferent to or unaware of the program, however, and the amount of flood insurance in force
dropped about 25 percent from $151 billion in 1986 to $113.8 billion in 1987. INSURANcE
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choose not to offer and consumers may choose not to buy. Because of
the adverse effects of this approach, even activist courts must carefully
limit their decisions to mandate coverage.10 3 Court-mandated cover-
age increases the possibility of adverse selection as insurers must
include in the risk pool less desirable risks that would generally be
avoided. 1" Insurers may increase premiums if a court expands the
scope of a policy's coverage, and consumers who would prefer nar-
rower but cheaper coverage must accept higher premiums and more
insurance than they would otherwise purchase.10 5
The reasonable expectations doctrine also suggests that the insured
must receive adequate notice of the exclusion. Insurers can draft poli-
cies that notify the insured that certain perils are excluded even
though not the proximate cause of the loss.1 6 The Washington cases
involved policies that attempted to exclude losses in which the
excluded peril played any role, regardless of the role played by the
non-excluded perils.10 7 The courts might have permitted the insurers
to deny coverage if the policies expressly excluded mudslide when
weather conditions caused or contributed to the mudslide.
B. Problems With the Washington Decisions
The Washington courts may have fashioned a rule that does not
give sufficient weight to the policy language in each individual case.
Washington's disregard of unambiguous exclusion clauses in multiple
causation cases presents a number of analytic and practical problems.
First, the Hirschmann court misapplied previous case law and failed to
articulate any other basis for its decision. Neither Villella, Graham,
precedent from other jurisdictions, nor principles of insurance law
supports a complete disregard of unambiguous policy language in mul-
tiple causation cases. Second, the Washington view may harm insur-
ance consumers by increasing premiums or reducing the availability of
homeowner's insurance. Finally, the Washington view may leave
insurers liable for potentially large losses for which they failed to col-
lect premiums.
103. Abraham, supra note 17, at 1163.
104. Id at 1187.
105. Id at 1188.
106. See supra note 82.
107. See supra notes 32 and 51 and accompanying text. The policies excluded damage caused
by the specified peril "directly or indirectly," or "in any sequence with a covered peril."
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L Neither Case Law Nor Principles of Insurance Law Supports the
Hirschmann Decision
The Hirschmann court misapplied previous case law. As Chief Jus-
tice Callow observed, the Hirschmann court relied entirely on Villella
for its rationale, offering no other basis for its decision. 108 Villella pro-
vided a questionable basis for the decision, however, because Villella
involved different policy language than Hirschmann. In Villella, the
policy merely excluded losses caused "directly or indirectly" by earth
movement, even if the earth movement only "contributed to or aggra-
vated" the damage."°9 However, the policy did not exclude losses
caused by both earth movement and a different covered peril. 110 In
Hirschmann, the policy excluded loss due to earth movement
"whether occurring alone or in any sequence with a covered peril."'11
That language unambiguously excluded all losses in which earth
movement played any role in causation. Perhaps the court overesti-
mated the significance of Vilella because that case was factually simi-
lar to Hirschmann.
Although principles of insurance law do not support the Hirsch-
mann decision, the doctrine of construing ambiguities against the
insurer supports the Graham and Villella decisions. Those cases
involved ambiguous policy language.112 Accordingly, the court con-
strued the ambiguities against the insurers.11 3 In Hirschmann, the pol-
icy was not ambiguous."' The policy clearly informed the insured
that losses due to earth movement were excluded, regardless of the
position of earth movement in the chain of causation.115 If this warn-
ing was insufficient to protect the insured's reasonable expectations of
coverage, the court should have indicated that the reasonable expecta-
tions principle supported the decision. The court failed to articulate a
reasonable expectations rationale for its decision, however, and instead
concluded that Villella was dispositive of Hirschmann. 116
108. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Hirschmann, 112 Wash. 2d 621, 631-35, 773 P.2d 413, 418-20
(Callow, C.J. dissenting).
109. Villella v. Public Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 106 Wash. 2d 806, 808-09, 725 P.2d 957, 959
(1986).
110. See Hirschmann, 112 Wash. 2d at 634, 773 P.2d at 419 (Callow, C.J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 624, 773 P.2d at 414.
112. See supra text accompanying note 60.
113. In the Ilirschmann dissent, Chief Justice Callow argued that Graham and Villella were
decided merely on the relevant policy language and that "these cases do not explicitly rest on
public policy grounds." Hirschmann, 112 Wash. 2d at 633, 773 P.2d at 418-19.
114. By failing to address the clarity of the policy language, the court seemed to concede that
the policy was not ambiguous.
115. Hirschmann, 112 Wash. 2d at 624, 773 P.2d at 414.
116. Id. at 626, 773 P.2d at 415.
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Principles of insurance law and decisions in other jurisdictions do
not support Washington's disregard of unambiguous exclusion clauses
in multiple causation cases. Commentators indicate that clear policy
language may resolve coverage issues before the proximate cause anal-
ysis is used.' 17 Courts generally require that any interpretation of a
policy must comply with the policy language itself."8 The relation-
ship between the coverage clause and the occurrence is generally a
threshold inquiry that denies coverage if the occurrence falls outside
the scope of coverage." 9 If an earth movement exclusion unambigu-
ously precludes coverage despite the operation of other causes, there is
no need to consider whether earth movement is the predominant cause
of the loss.
2. The Invalidation of Unambiguous Exclusion Clauses May Harm
Insurance Consumers
In attempting to protect homeowners, the Washington Supreme
Court has fashioned a rule that may eventually harm insurance con-
sumers. If the courts mandate coverage in multiple causation cases
regardless of policy terms, insurers will face four alternatives. First,
insurers may simply do nothing and accept the increased potential lia-
bility. This is unlikely because insurers, like all corporations, seek to
maximize their profits and minimize their exposure. 120 Second, insur-
ers may eliminate all-risk homeowner's policies and substitute named
peril policies in their place.12' If insurers eliminate all-risk policies,
117. Policy language may deny coverage even when "there is a contributing cause that would
otherwise be a basis for extending coverage." R. KEETON & A. WI~ss, supra note 17, at
549-50.
118. Even when broadly construing coverage, courts are limited to interpretations "that may
be fairly made of the language in an insurance policy." Id. at 556.
119. Whether an insurance policy covers an occurrence "is a matter of contract construction.
Once that question is answered, then the causal question arises whether that occurrence gives rise
to legal responsibility." McDowell, Causation in Contracts and Insurance, 20 CONN. L. REv.
569, 576 (1988).
120. See generally J. LAUNIE, J. LEE & N. BAGLINI, supra note 22, at 8-10 (describing the
underwriting purposes of generating profits and avoiding improper risk selection). In the case of
earth movement exclusions, insurers soon responded to California's concurrent causation
doctrine by modifying policies and seeking legislation that prevented the doctrine from being
applied in the case of earthquake. INSURANCE INFORMATION INsTrruTE, ISSUE PAPER:
CONCURRENT CAUSATION (April 1985).
121. Insurers may gradually be replacing all-risk policies with named peril homeowner's
policies. In response to the California cases, the Insurance Services Office, an influential
organization that provides technical services to the insurance industry, eliminated the term "all-
risk" from homeowner's policies to clarify the insurers' intention to exclude some perils
regardless of their role in causation. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTrrUTE, supra note 120.
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insureds will be deprived of the benefits of those policies.12 2 Third,
insurers may raise rates. Many insureds will have to pay a higher
price for more coverage than they wish to purchase. Fourth, insurers
may be more selective in underwriting. Insurers may refuse to issue
homeowner's policies when they have doubts concerning the potential
for loss due to the peril they wish to exclude. Some people may thus
be deprived of the opportunity to purchase standard homeowner's
insurance at a reasonable cost.
Judicial invalidation of policy exclusions makes the pricing and
underwriting of insurance policies particularly difficult. 23  Every
exclusion exists because the insurer would face added exposure with-
out it.124 Earth movement exclusions like those presented in Graham,
Villella, and Hirschmann address the concern of adverse selection.
People who live in geologically unstable areas 125 are more likely than
most homeowners to suffer loss due to mudslides and earthquakes. By
forcing insurers to cover damage caused in part by earth movement,
the Washington Supreme Court has stripped insurers of an important
tool in avoiding adverse selection. If damage due to earth movement
may not be categorically excluded, people living in geologically unsta-
ble areas will be a part of the general homeowner risk pool.
If Washington courts completely disregard policy language in multi-
ple causation cases, homeowners may have to pay higher premiums to
cover damage suffered by people who pose a much higher than average
risk due to earth movement.126  If those decisions increase claims,
insurers must raise premiums to continue underwriting all-risk poli-
122. For example, insureds may no longer be indemnified when neither party foresees a peril
that causes damage. Policyholders would also assume the burden of proof rather than insurers
when difficulties arise in proving the source and cause of the damage. R. KEETON & A. WIDISS,
supra note 17, at 463.
123. One underwriting text describes judicial decisions as the most elusive and uncertain legal
hazard that an insurer must consider. R. HOLTOM, UNDERWITING PRINCIPLES AND
PRAcTCES 253 (1973). Legal doctrines may require an insurer to raise rates or deny coverage.
Id. at 253-54.
124. J. LAuNiE, J. LEE & N. BAGLINI, supra note 22, at 131.
125. Examples of geologically unstable areas and increased risk of loss include the following:
A building located on low land poses a higher risk of flood loss; a building on a steep hillside
poses a higher risk of loss due to landslide; and a structure built on filled land poses a higher risk
of earthquake damage. Id at 59.
126. Earth movement losses are generally quite expensive. Meehan & Jelks, supra note 86, at
24. While the average fire loss is under $10,000, many slide repair projects cost three to five
times the value of the house. In particularly bad years, the totrl loss from landslides in
California may approach 25 percent of homeowner's insurance premiums paid in that state. Ia
Earth movement damage in the United States approaches $5 billion per year. Id. at 20.
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cies. 1 2 7 The proximate cause doctrine may also increase insurers'
administration and legal costs, which will be passed along to policy-
holders in the form of higher premiums. 2 '
Some property owners would suffer considerable hardship if insur-
ers chose not to underwrite properties in geologically unstable areas.
Judge-made doctrines have created insurance availability problems in
other areas of coverage. 129 When insurers are unable to predict the
risk and magnitude of loss, they often refuse to underwrite the risk.
130
Insurers may also decline to cover a risk if they are unable to collect
adequate premiums.13 1 The proximate cause doctrine creates consid-
erable uncertainty regarding the insurer's exposure to future loss. If
insurers choose not to underwrite high-risk properties, those proper-
ties will become far less desirable, because all mortgage companies
require the applicant to obtain homeowner's insurance before making
a home loan.
3. The Invalidation of Unambiguous Exclusion Clauses May Expose
Insurers to Large Losses for Which They Failed to
Collect Premiums
The Hirschmann decision may have consequences in Washington
that extend beyond damage caused by mudflows. The Washington
Supreme Court's refusal to observe unambiguous exclusion clauses
and the unpredictability of the proximate cause doctrine may be par-
ticularly disastrous in the case of earthquakes, which often initiate
chains of causation that produce enormous damage.' 32 Washington
127. R. HOLTOM, supra note 123, at 17. Property insurance rates are dependent upon the
insured's risk of exposure to forces of nature. Id. at 240.
128. Proximate cause is confusing and unpredictable in specific circumstances. See, e.g.,
Comment, Autopsy of a Plain English Insurance Contract Can Plain English Survive Proximate
Cause?, 59 WAsHs. L. REV. 565, 566-67 (1984). This uncertainty may increase litigation of
individual claims, thereby increasing insurers' legal and claims investigation costs. See eg.,
Litsey, supra note 2, at 417; McDowell, supra note 119, at 585. Administrative and litigation
costs are significant factors in insurance premiums. Berger, The Impact of Tort Law
Development on Insurance: The Availability/Affordability Crisis and Its Potential Solutions, 37
AM. U.L. REV. 285, 317-18 (1988).
129. For example, the rise of the judicial doctrine of strict liability was a major factor in the
current availability crisis in products liability insurance. Berger, supra note 128, at 298.
130. Id. at 303.
131. See R. HOLTOM, supra note 123, at 134.
132. For example, the Loma Prieta quake that shook northern California on October 17,
1989 caused insured losses of $600 million. The quake damaged 105,000 houses and 3,500
commercial buildings. Sixty-seven people died and 3,700 were injured. Only about 20% of
homeowners in California had earthquake insurance at that time. INSURANCE INFORMATION
INSTTUTE, DATA BASE REPORTS 2 (Feb. 1991). In the past 30 years, several quakes have
caused property damage of $300 million or more. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, supra
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homeowners generally do not buy earthquake insurance. 133  Insurers
may therefore be liable for huge losses for which they failed to collect
premiums. In the absence of legislation that protects insurers from
this unfair and potentially catastrophic result,134 the Washington
courts should permit insurers to exclude all damage related to earth-
quakes and other natural disasters.
III. CONCLUSION
Washington, like California, has decided that an insurer may not
deny coverage simply because an excluded peril contributed to the loss
in a multiple causation case. However, it is unclear whether the
Washington courts will completely disregard unambiguous policy lan-
guage in the future. The Washington courts should take the narrowest
possible view of the latest decisions. Washington should permit insur-
ers to conditionally exclude perils by describing those perils generally
in the exclusions section of the policy. Courts in other jurisdictions
should not follow the Washington and California multiple causation
insurance decisions. Rather, those courts should continue to first
examine the relevant policy language before applyiag proximate cause
analysis. Only by looking first to the policy language may courts pro-
tect the reasonable expectations of the parties, permit insurers to
apportion premiums based upon risk exposure, and observe the estab-
lished principles of insurance law.
La'wrence Alan Wans
note 102, at 78. Estimates of property losses in the event of a major earthquake in a population
center run to $60 billion or more. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, DATA BASE
REPORTS, supra, at 5.
133. Although earthquake insurance "is generally available, relatively few property owners
have taken advantage of the protection it offers." INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, supra
note 102, at 78.
134. Insurers doing business in California feared that the doctrine of concurrent causation
could result in courts holding insurers liable for billions of dollars in unanticipated earthquake
losses. No premiums had been collected for such losses. INSURANCE :NFORMATION INSTITUTE,
supra note 120. In return for agreeing to offer earthquake protection to all homeowners in
California, property insurers have received legislative protection from earthquake-related claims
based on concurrent causation. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10081, 10088 (West 1991). Section
10088 provides that courts may not find coverage where an earthquake partially causes a loss if
the policy excludes the peril of earthquake.
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